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Aliens' Right to Teach: Political
Socialization and the Public Schools
In recent years, aliens' have made great strides against state-imposed
employment discrimination. 2 Some commentators read recent Supreme
Court opinions in Sugarman v. Dou gall3 and In re Griffiths4 as in-
validating virtually all state laws that require United States citizenship
as a prerequisite to employment. 5 Nonetheless, many states still bar
aliens from teaching in public elementary and secondary schools.
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of state-imposed restrictions
on the employment of alien teachers. It argues that Sugarman and
Griffiths, while greatly limiting the scope of permissible discrimina-
tion against aliens, recognize an excepted area for jobs which have a
critical relationship to the identity and legitimacy of the political
community. Public school teaching might fit within this area of allow-
1. All references are to permanent resident aliens. An alien is "any person not a
citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1970). To acquire per-
manent residence, an alien must possess an immigrant visa and thus have "been law-
fully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant
in accordance with the immigration laws .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970). Virtually
all aliens permitted to be employed for an indefinite time have permanent residence
status. The only other aliens legally permitted to work in the United States do so
on a temporary basis. These persons are designated "nonimmigrant" aliens. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15) (1970). Telephone interview with Ralph Farb, Deputy General Counsel, Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, Wash., D.C., Sept. 12, 1975.
2. The extent to which state and local law has restricted the employment oppor-
tunities of aliens can be seen in the limitations only recently invalidated. Taggart v.
Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1975) (state statute making citizenship a prerequisite
to licensing as a notary public); Sundram v. City of Niagara Falls, 77 Misc. 2d 1002,
357 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct., Niagara Co. 1973) (city ordinance making citizenship a
prerequisite to licensing as a taxi cab driver); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects &
Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, No. 74-520 (D.P.R., Dec. 19, 1974), prob. juris. noted,
95 S. Ct. 1988 (1975) (Puerto Rico statute requiring that applicants be citizens in order
to be granted full licenses as engineers, architects or surveyors). The Supreme Court
is presently considering whether the federal civil service can exclude aliens. Mow Sun
Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 944 (1974).
For a discussion of the full scope of these laws, see M. KONviTZ, THE ALIEN AND rHe
AsIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946); Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right
to Work, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1012 (1957); Note, Protection of Alien Rights Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1971 DUKE L.J. 583; Comment, Aliens, Employment, and Equal
Protection, 19 VILL. L. REV. 589, 590-95 (1974).
3. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
4. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
5. See Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Impact of the Con-
stitution and Federal Civil Rights Law, 35 U. Pitr. L. REv. 499 (1974); Comment, supra
note 2, at 590.
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able discrimination if the state has an interest in using its public
schools for such a critical political function-in particular, the educa-
tion of students for participation in the political community. The
necessary assessment is whether the nature of a teacher's role in the
process of political socialization creates a substantial state interest
which could justify denying teacher certification on the basis of
alienage. The Note concludes that the states do have some legitimate
interest in the process of political socialization in the public schools.
But because of First Amendment considerations and the imprecision
of the certification laws in their present form, this interest is insuf-
ficient to validate current state laws discriminating against alien
teachers.
I. Alienage and Equal Protection
The right of the states to provide for and regulate public education
has long been recognized.6 As part of this responsibility, all of the
states supervise the licensing of teachers in the public schools.- Twenty-
one states use United States citizenship as a qualification for certifi-
cation as a public school teacher,8 thus restricting an alien's oppor-
tunity to teach.
Two main types of restrictions are imposed.9 In six states, a resident
alien is unable to secure a permanent license to teach whether or not
he or she plans to be naturalized. 10 In 12 other states, an alien may
6. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (dictum); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (dictum); Myers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1922)
(dictum). Most states have constitutional provisions requiring that the state legislature
create a system of public education. See A. MORRIs, ThE CONSTITUnON AND A'MERIcAN
EDUCATION 113 (1974).
7. All 50 states require that a teacher be certified before teaching in a public school.
See T. STINNETT, A 'MANUAL ON STANDARDS AFFECTING SCHOOL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (Nat'l Educ. Ass'n 1974). In addition, 29 states require certification of some
teaching personnel in private, parochial, or independent schools. See id. at 3, 10. Unless
otherwise noted, all references below are to certification requirements for public school
teachers only.
For purposes of equal protection analysis, discrimination against aliens in the employ-
ment of public school teachers constitutes state action by virtue both of the state-imposed
certification requirements and the public character of the municipality or school district
providing the employment. Although this Note will focus on the mandatory certification
requirements, the analysis would apply equally to any local policy to pass over aliens in
hiring teachers.
8. The number of states requiring citizenship for certification has declined by one-
third in the last eight years. (In 1967 the number was 32.) See T. STINNE'T, A MANUAL
ON CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SCHOOL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (Nat'l
Educ. Ass'n 1970). In many states, the state board of education is authorized to set
requirements for certification. Id. at 31. Thus, restrictions on aliens' right to teach are
imposed both by statute and by the regulations issued by state departments of education.
9. The following survey of types of citizenship requirements was completed in
February, 1975.
10. REGULATIONS OF CONN. STATE AGENCIES § 10-146-2(d) (1971); Mississippi (see T.
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be certified provisionally upon declaring his or her intent to become
a citizen." Cutting across these categories, in 10 states an alien can
be certified when participating in a federal or state exchange pro-
gram. 12 In addition, four states will grant a temporary certificate at
the request of a school principal or other official who is willing to
employ an alien. 13
The Supreme Court recognized in 1886 that the equal protection
clause extends to aliens. 4 Nevertheless, because of the courts' use of
the rational relation standard'3 and acceptance of the states' asserted
STINNETT, supra note 7, at 24); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-6004 (1971); NEV. REV. ST.AT.
§ 391.060 (1965); South Carolina (see T. STINNETT, supra at 24); cf. Rhode Island Re-
quirements for Certification (on file with Yale Law journal) (if an alien lacks citizenship
only because he or she has resided in the United States for too short a period to be
eligible for naturalization, the citizenship requirement may be waived).
11. IDAHO CODE § 33-1202(4) (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 21-1 (Smith-Hurd
1972); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 38G (1974); MICH. Co.P. LAws ANN. § 340.852
(1975); N.J. REV. STAT. § 6.11-3.10 (1970) (including an exception for foreign language
teachers who have not declared their intention of becoming citizens and who have
resided in the United States for less than 10 years); N.Y. EDUc. LAw §§ 3001, 3001-a
(McKinney Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-36-07 (1971); DEP'T OF EDUC., OKLA.,
TEACHER EDUCATION, CERTIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT HANDBOOK 56 (1971) (on file with Yale
Law Journal) (hereinafter cited as OKLAHOMA CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK); TEXAS EDuc.
CODE § 13.044 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.67.020 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18A-3-1 (1971); Wyoming (see T. STINNETr, supra note 7, at 24).
12. REcS. OF CONN. STATE AGENCIES § 10-146-2(d) (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.17(2)
(Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 33-1202(4) (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. Clh. 122, § 21-1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1975); MICH. CoasP. LAws ANN. § 340.852 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 75-6005 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.070 (1968); OKLAHOMA CERTIFICATION HAND-
BOOK, supra note 11, at 56; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.67.020 (1970); W. VAL. CODE ANN.
§ 18A-3-1 (1971).
8 U.S.C. § Il01(a)(15)(J) (1970) authorizes a nonimmigrant alien to work temporarily
in the United States if he or she is part of an exchange program. This applies to
any alien
having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning
who is a bona fide student, scholar, trainee, teacher, professor, research assistant,
specialist, or leader in a field of specialized knowledge or skill, or other person of
similar description, who is coming temporarily to the United States as a participant
in a program designated by the Secretary of State, for the purpose of teaching,
instructing or lecturing, studying, observing, conducting research, consulting, demon-
strating special skills, or receiving training ....
13. REGS. OF CONN. STATE AGENCIES § 10-146-2(d) (1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-
6005 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-36-11 (Supp. 1973); letter to Lon S. Babby from
W.H. Jones, Director, Div. of Teacher Educ., State Dep't of Educ., Va., Dec. 24, 1974
(on file with Yale Law Journal).
There are two states that do not fit any of the categories above. In Florida, an
alien may be certified if his or her services are needed and he or she takes an oath
of allegiance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.17(1), (2), (3) (1974). In South Dakota, any alien
who meets the usual qualifications may be temporarily certified. S.D. Regs. (on file
with Yale Law Journal).
14. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating refusal of San Francisco
board of supervisors to grant licenses for operation of laundries to Chinese residents
of the city).
15. See Note, Protection of Alien Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendnet, supra
note 2, at 588; Comment, supra note 2, at 590-99. The Supreme Court has traditionally
used a two-tier approach in evaluating claims that a state statute violates the equal
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interest in preserving jobs for their own citizens, 6 the early successes
of aliens in opposing employment discrimination were few and far
between. 17 In 1971, the Supreme Court stated in Graham v. Richard-
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 H.ARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Under the "rational relation" test, a state must demon-
strate that the challenged classification rests on grounds reasonably related to the ad-
vancement of a permissible objective. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1079 (1969). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)
("[the constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective"). However, a classification
based upon a "suspect" criterion invokes a more stringent level of judicial review.
(This more stringent standard of protection is also invoked when a classification touches
upon a fundamental interest.) The operative effect of declaring a classification suspect
is that the state must bear the "heavy burden" of showing a "compelling" interest to
justify the law. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). See Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, supra at 1087-1120. In addition, the state must demonstrate that the
classification advances the interest with precision.
The "precision" of a classification is the manner in which it relates to the purpose
of the law. Essentially the question is "whether all and only those persons similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law" are treated equally by the classification.
Id. at 1082. A classification may be underinclusive in that it does not include within the
class all persons similarly situated. Alternatively, it may be overinclusive in that it in-
cludes persons who are not similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Quite often a classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive. See Tussman & ten-
Brock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949). A perfect classifica-
tion is virtually impossible to attain. However, the degree of allowable imperfection varies
with the criterion of classification. When a suspect category is involved, the courts will
tolerate less variance from a perfect classification and may demand that "less drastic
means" be used to achieve the statutory purpose. See Gunther, supra at 21.
16. In the past, the states have tried to justify restriction of alien employment by
pointing to a "special public interest" in preserving jobs for state citizens. Heim v.
McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915); Rok v. Legg,
27 F. Stipp. 243, 245 (S.D. Cal. 1939). See Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on
Aliens' Right to Work, supra note 2, at 1016-18. The rationale was best articulated by
Judge Cardozo in People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, aff'd sub nom. Crane v.
New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915):
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination, for
the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the ad-
vancement and profit of the members of the state....
Id. at 161, 108 N.E. at 429.
The state in determining what use shall be made of its own moneys, may legit-
imately consult the welfare of its own citizens rather than that of aliens. Whatever
is a privilege rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship. In its
war against poverty, the state is not required to dedicate its own resources to citi-
zens and aliens alike.
Id. at 164, 108 N.E. at 430.
17. In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), the Court invalidated a state statute which
required that 80 percent of the emplo)ees in any business be U.S. citizens. The Court
stated that "the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the com-
munity is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [14th] Amendment to secure." Id. at 41. The decision was based both
on equal protection and on the exclusive constitutional authority of the federal govern-
mnent to regulate immigration and naturalization. See note 18 infra.
In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), the Court rejected the
restriction of commercial fishing licenses to citizens. Again the decision was grounded
on both the equal protection clause and the federal government's preemptive regulation
of immigration and naturalization.
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son that classifications based on alienage were "suspect,"1 8 and also
rejected the "special public interest" of a state in preserving jobs for
its citizens.I 9 In so ruling, the Court paved the way for the two de-
cisions that have greatly narrowed the allowable area of restrictions
on alien employment.
A. Sugarman v. Dougall: The Excepted Area
In 1973, in Sugarman v. Dougall,2 0 the Supreme Court considered
an equal protection challenge to a provision of New York State's
civil service law excluding aliens from jobs classified as "competi-
tive."2' 1 The state asserted a substantial interest in guaranteeing that
a civil servant who " 'participates directly in the formulation and ex-
ecution of government policy' "22 be unimpaired in the fulfillment of
18. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close ju-
dicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and insular"
minority . .. for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.
Despite the Graham declaration, alienage may be distinguished from race as a
suspect category. First, alienage is not an "unalterable trait." Rather, it is a "govern-
mentally created status" from which a permanent resident alien can remove himself
voluntarily by applying for naturalization. (Once an alien has secured an immigrant visa
and thus has qualified for permanent residency, there are no further numerical quotas
to limit his or her chances for naturalization.) See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73
(1972) (dictum that earlier cases invoked strict scrutiny where "certain classifications based
on unalterable traits such as race and lineage" were used); Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F.
Supp. 1, 8 (S.D. Fla. 1973) ("the fact that alienage is a governmentally created status
suggests that it may not constitute such a consistently illegitimate distinction as to
warrant mechanical application of the compelling interest test").
Second, alienage is a political status subject to Congress's power to regulate naturali-
zation and immigration. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4: "The Congress shall have Power
* . * To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization .... ." Though many alienage
cases have turned on an equal protection/suspectness analysis, always remaining in the
background is the possibility that a disability accorded aliens by the federal government
will be sustained by virtue of federal power to regulate naturalization and immigration
and that a disability accorded aliens by a state will be voided by virtue of its interfer-
ence with that exclusive federal power. But see note 37 infra.
19. 403 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1971). The Court gave several reasons for rejecting the
"special public interest" rationale. For one, it was based on a right/privilege distinction
that was no longer viable. Second, the state's concern with limiting expenditures was not
sufficiently compelling. Third, the state could have no "special interest" in tax revenues
to which the alien also contributed. The rationale was under attack for many years
before Graham; indeed it was originally undermined by Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948).
20. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
21. At the time of the action, New York civil service employees were divided into
"classified" and "unclassified" positions. Of the four categories of classified positions,
only the competitive class (filled on the basis of a competitive examination) required
citizenship. The other categories of classified civil service (including upper echelon posi-
tions in the state executive, municipal and judicial departments) and the unclassified
service (including elective offices, executive and legislative appointments, and teaching
positions) did not require citizenship. Id. at 639-40.
22. Id. at 641 (quoting from appellants' brief).
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his duties by allegiance to a foreign government. Though the Court
proceeded to hold that the provision excluding aliens was too impre-
cise, 23 it did not wholly reject the premise of the state's argument.
Rather the Court accepted that there was some limited area of em-
ployment for which citizenship constitutionally could be required.2 4
The guidelines provided by the Court to describe this "excepted
area" were put in terms which, though ambiguous, may be broad
reaching. The Court noted the states' interest in preserving " 'the basic
conception of a political community' "25 and suggested that citizenship
as a qualification was permissible not only for voters, but for elective
positions and "important nonelective executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial positions .... ,,26The Court reasoned that incumbents of such
positions are "officers who participate directly in the formulation,
execution, or review of broad public policy" and thus "perform func-
tions that go to the heart of representative government."' 27
Sugarman did not make clear whether aliens may be flatly excluded
from some positions of state or municipal employment which cannot
be categorized as "offices" 28 and which do not involve the formulation
23. Id. at 642-43. In view of the proffered justification, the restriction was both
underinclusive and overinclusive. It was underinclusive because it did not require citi-
zenship for the upper-level jobs in the classified and unclassified civil service where
citizenship was arguably essential to effective performance. Similarly the restriction was
overinclusive because it indiscriminately excluded aliens from jobs far removed from
the formulation and execution of governmental policy, such as sanitation workers and
typists. Id. at 643.
24. Id. at 646-47. Despite the diffident wording of the last section of Sugarman
("Neither do we hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of positions,
require citizenship .... " 413 U.S. at 647), the Court's description of the excepted area
was not really dicta. Rather it was critical to the Court's holding that the New York civil
service statute excluding aliens was underinclusive. See id. at 642-43.
25. Id. at 647, quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972). See 413 U.S.
at 642-43 (citation omitted):
We recognize a State's interest in establishing its own form of government, and in
limiting participation in that government to those who are within "the basic con-
ception of a political community." . . . We recognize, too, the State's broad power
to define its political community. But in seeking to achieve this substantial purpose,
with discrimination against aliens, the means the State employs must be precisely
drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose.
26. 413 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Which nonelective positions constitute offices under state law varies considerably
from state to state. Among the characteristics considered in determining whether a po-
sition is an office or employment are (1) the delegation of sovereign powers; (2) par-
ticipation in important policymaking and decisionmaking in the governmental unit;
(3) the requirement of an official oath and official bond; and (4) appointment for a
definite term, with authority conferred by law. See E. IMCQUILLIN, THE LAW op MUNICI-
PAL CoRronxTIrONs § 12.30 (rev. 3d ed. 1973). The lack of any clear standard for deter-
mining who is an "officer" and who is a mere "employee" is a strong reason for not
reading Sugarman's reference to "officers" as exhausting all permissible areas of dis-
crimination.
Teachers are generally considered to be employees rather than officers. See cases cited
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of high-level policy. However, Sugarman's emphasis on the state's sub-
stantial interest in defining and preserving a political community does
suggest that exclusion is permissible when the position is, in some
sense, essential to preserving the identity of the political community.
The Court's explicit exception for "officers" may fairly be read as a
consequence of this underlying concern; the excepted area thus might
also include other jobs having a critical relationship to the preserva-
tion of the political community, even if those jobs cannot be classified
as "offices.."
29
B. In re Griffiths
In re Griffith, 30 decided the same day as Sugarman, may seem to
narrow the excepted area of employment for which citizenship is a
permissible state-imposed qualification. The case concerned the ex-
clusion of an alien, a Netherlands woman named Fre Le Poole Grif-
fiths, from admission to the bar in Connecticut.31 In an effort to meet
the " 'heavy burden' "32 required to justify a classification based on
alienage, the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee pointed to the at-
torney's role as an officer of the court. The Court in turn recognized
the state's interest in ensuring that licensed attorneys be qualified,
but concluded that an attorney's powers, whether to sign writs or take
depositions, "hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of such
unique responsibility as to entrust them only to citizens."33 The Court
in Griffiths also refused to hold that the mere licensing of a lawyer
by the state was sufficient to place him "so close to the core of the
in 56 Ai. JUR. 2o Municipal Corporations § 234, at 295 n.6 (1971); 68 id., Schools § 129,
at 459 n.79 (1973); E. MCQUILUN, supra § 12.31, at 184-85 n.49.
29. This reading of Sugarman is reinforced by the Court's cryptic comment that it
was not ruling out the possibility that
on the basis of an individualized determination, an alien may not be refused, or dis-
charged from, public employment, even on the basis of noncitizenship, if the re-
fusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on legitimate state interests that relate to
qualifications for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee.
Id. at 646-47.
One might attempt to narrow Sugarman by pointing to the fact that it anchored the
right of states to control the qualifications of officers and voters in the text of the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV, § 4. See 413 U.S. at 648. But the states' interest in political
socialization, if equally essential to effective government, could be given the very same
textual support.
30. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
31. The plaintiff had lived in Connecticut for five )ears. She was eligible for naturali-
zation, but had taken no steps toward becoming a citizen. Id. at 718. The Connecticut
supreme court upheld the exclusion. In re Fre Le Poole Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 294
A.2d 281 (1972).
32. 413 U.S. at 721, quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); cf. 413
U.S. at 730 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See note 15 supra.
33. 413 U.S. at 724.
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political process as to make him a formulator of government policy." 34
On its face, Griffiths suggests that the Sugarman exception will be
narrowly defined. However, the nature of the bar committee's argu-
ment in Griffiths may limit the reach of the decision. The bar com-
mittee relied heavily upon a lawyer's status as an officer of the court,
attempting to analogize an attorney's role to regular public office."5
The Court in Griffiths clearly held that the lawyer is not within the
excepted area of official governmental positions closely related to
the political community,3 6 but the opinion fails to illuminate the
proper mode of analysis for determining whether other state-licensed
positions which cannot be characterized as official might fall within
that exception.
C. Perkins v. Smith
In view of Graham's rejection of the "special public interest" ratio-
nale and Sugarman's definition of the excepted area, a state's justifica-
tion for alien discrimination must apparently shift from economic
to political interests.37 An important example of successful reliance on
34. Id. at 729.
35. Id. at 723-25, 727-29; Brief for Appellee at 19-21.
36. Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of responsibility and influence
that impose on them duties correlative with their right of access to the courts ...
Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue of their being lawyers.
413 U.S. at 729.
37. The "excepted area" allowed by Sugarman and Griffiths for state discrimination
against aliens is probably not narrowed by any preemptive effect of the federal gov-
ernment's power to regulate immigration and naturalization. Sugarman and Griffiths
did not formally reach any question of preemption, as the civil service and bar com-
mittee restrictions were voided on equal protection grounds. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 638, 646 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 n.3 (1973). However, the Court's
explicit recognition of the excepted area in Sugarman seems to imply that once a state
has satisfied the standards of equal protection, it will have no difficulty in meeting the
challenge of the supremacy clause.
So long as the states sought to justify broad exclusion of aliens from employment
on the basis of the state's "special public interest" in preserving employment for state
citizens, the conflict with federal power was potentially more acute. Under the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act, the admission of some aliens is dependent on an assess-
ment by the Secretary of Labor of the labor market conditions in the alien's field of
employment. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970) (aliens seeking entry "for the purpose of per-
forming skilled or unskilled labor" are excluded unless the Secretary of Labor determines
that "there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing,
qualified, and available at the time of application . . . and at the place to which
the alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor"). Reliance by a state
on the "special public interest" rationale involved a conflicting conclusion that employ-
ment in the state was needed for state citizens. In addition, what the Truax Court
said in striking down a broad state-imposed restriction of aliens' private employment
may apply as well to broad restrictions of state and municipal employment:
The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a live-
lihood when lawfully admitted to the State would be tantamount to the assertion
of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot
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political interests to uphold a restrictive statute is Perkins v. Smith,38
decided by a three-judge district court in Maryland and now on appeal.
Perkins concerned the exclusion of aliens from service on state and
federal juries, an exclusion imposed respectively by state and federal
statutes.
The Perkins court sustained the exclusion, holding that a jury's
largely unreviewable role as the arbiter of factual issues in criminal
and civil cases made it a critical decisionmaking body, "one of the
institutions at the heart of our system of government. ' 30 Citizenship
was necessary for effective performance as a juror because aliens, as
a class, were less "conversant with the social and political institutions
of the society" and with the "nuances of local tradition and language."
In addition, an alien's foreign allegiance might distort the way he
or she chose to apply the laws.40 Since any independent attempt at
ascertaining loyalty would undercut existing naturalization procedures,
the use of citizenship as a gauge of allegiance was "compelled by cir-
cumstances.
' '4 1
live where they cannot work. And, if such a policy were permissible, the practical
result would be that those lawfully admitted to the country under the authority
of the acts of Congress . . . would be segregated in such of the States as chose
to offer hospitality.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
38. 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), appeal docketed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June
21, 1974).
39. 370 F. Supp. at 137.
40. A juror "who lacked any concern for the fairness of the outcome could severely
obstruct or distort the course of justice." Id. at 138. Indeed, a "single persuasive and
unprincipled juror could even direct the course of justice into channels deliberately
chosen for their deleterious effect on this country." Id. The fact that Perkins deals
with what is arguably a political right and not with economic discrimination seems
significant to the validation of the restriction. One can view jury service as a political
right in that the jury, by utilizing its power of nullification, can modify the substantive
law passed by the legislature. Thus, one can argue that restricting an alien's right
to serve on a jury is merely a recognition of "a State's constitutional responsibility for
the establishment and operation of its own government .... Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
41. Judge Winter, in his concurrence, differed with the majority by finding that
there were "less drastic means" of ensuring that alien jurors were fluent in English and
familiar with American laws and institutions; nonetheless Winter strongly agreed that
allegiance and "commitment" to the United States were fundamental to a juror's quali-
fication. 370 F. Supp. at 140. "Citizens, as a rule, harbor positive feelings toward their
sovereign and possess a sense of identity with their fellow citizens." Id. at 141. Where
American law "resolves a question of public policy" or "definles] interpersonal relation-
ships" differently than the law of an alien's own country, it is
not unreasonable to believe that resident aliens may be likely to permit their positive
feelings toward their foreign sovereigns and their sense of identity to their fellow-
countrymen to impair their commitment to the enforcement and application of
American law in those situations ....
Id. In addition, native-born and naturalized jurors who are eligible to vote and run
for public office "have, at least theoretically, some influence upon the content of the
laws" and would reasonably be expected to "have a greater commitment to their proper
application and enforcement than those lacking such influence." And of course such
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Perkins, recently echoed by a Fifth Circuit decision in United States
v. Gordon-Nikkar,42 has an important bearing on an alien's right to
teach because it establishes that at least some state positions which are
not high-level governmental appointments may fall within the Sugar-
man exception. The opinion recognizes that critical functions going
"'to the heart of representative government' 43 are sometimes dele-
gated to positions outside the upper levels of any governmental or
bureaucratic hierarchy. The Perkins court does fit jury service within
the explicit language of the Sugarman exception for offices, noting that
jurors hold " 'important nonelective ... judicial positions' " and "par-
ticipate directly in the execution" of the law. 4 But Perkins makes no
mention of the term "office," and thus puts a more functional gloss
on Sugarman's language, judging the bounds of the excepted positions
by their actual relationship to the political community.
II. Teachers and the State's Interest in Education
In order to place teachers within the Sttgarman exception, the states
will have to show45 a close relationship between education, the teacher,
personal commitment "is not susceptible of objective measurement." Id. at 141. Thus
Perkins recognizes that formal allegiance may be important as a signal of the attitude of
persons involved in making judgments that depend on an intangible sense of commitment.
42. 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975). Gordon-Nikkar concerned the exclusion of aliens
from federal juries only. The issue was raised by the motion of a criminal defendant
to quash a jury panel on the ground that the exclusion of resident aliens deprived her
of the Sixth Amendment right to trial before a jury representative of the community.
The Gordon-Nikkar court noted the Supreme Court's dictum in Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970), that states are "free to confine the selection [of jurors] to
citizens ...." 518 F.2d at 976 n.4. But it also relied heavily on Perhins's equal protection
analysis:
We agree with the [Perkins] court's conclusion that there was a compelling interest
"in ensuring that persons who serve as jurors are personally committed to the proper
application and enforcement of the laws of the United States" which therefore
justifies the exclusion of aliens.
518 F.2d at 976. Though the Gordon-Nikkar decision cited as an additional justification
Congress's plenary authority to regulate the entry and residence of aliens, a ground
peculiar to federal measures excluding aliens, the court explicitly noted that the Perkins
ground was sufficient. Id. at 977. An interest in ensuring that jurors are committed to
the "proper application of the laws" is applicable of course both to state and federal
juries.
43. 370 F. Supp. at 137, quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
44. Id., quoting and paraphrasing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
45. The arguments that follow in the text, which might support the denial of teacher
certification to aliens, have not been offered by any state in litigation. However, these
arguments are probably the only grounds left for a justification in light of Sugarman
v. Dougall and In re Griffiths. The arguments are dubbed the "state's position"
throughout the remainder of the Note.
There is only one court decision dealing with the restriction of the alien's right to
be certified as a public school teacher. In Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (D. Ariz.
1972), aff'd mem., 413 U.S. 902 (1973), a three-judge district court invalidated both a
state constitutional provision which denied aliens the opportunity to be employed in any
state, county or municipal job, and a state law enacted under the authority of that
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and the political community. The validity of the restrictions against
aliens will depend in the first instance on whether a public school
teacher performs functions that are so intimately involved with the
maintenance and identity of the political community as to make an
alien unsuitable in the part.
Education does have an essential role in forming and preserving the
character of the political community.4 6 One primary function of edu-
provision which made aliens ineligible for employment in any public institution, in-
cluding public schools. 351 F. Supp. at 739-40. The court based its decision on both
equal protection and preemption grounds. Id. at 740. The state's only apparent argu-
ment in support of the laws was the "special public interest" rationale (see note 16
supra), which had been treated with little sympathy by the Supreme Court less than two
years earlier in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-75 (1971).
While Miranda voided an alien employment restriction grounded on the state's pro-
prietary interest in preserving jobs for its citizens, it sheds little light on the general
status of restrictions against alien teachers. For one, Miranda dealt with a broad, im-
precise exclusion of aliens from all state employment, including teaching. Thus, while
the litigation happened to involve a teacher, the state's argument and the court's anal)sis
did not focus in any way on the special functions of the teacher in political society.
Secondly, the case preceded Sugarman and Griffiths; hence the state's justification was
not tailored to the standards articulated in those cases. Finally, the fact that Miranda
was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court limits the precedential value of
the case. See Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (Summary affirmances which
preceded Edelman "obviously are of precedential value . . . . Equally obviously, they
are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the
question on the merits"); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("When we summarily affirm, without opinion, the judgment of a three-
judge District Court we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which
it was reached. . . . Indeed, upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review,
the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances may
appear to have established."); Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals:
The Significance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L.
REv. 373 (1972). As a result, Miranda cannot be said to provide much guidance for
analyzing a carefully drawn state statute requiring citizenship for teacher certification.
The only other determinations of the constitutionality of statutes denying aliens
teaching certificates are the formal opinions of three states' attorneys general. The At-
torney General of California found a provision of the California Education Code ex-
cluding alien teachers to be unconstitutional. 53 OP. CAL. A'r'y GEN. 63 (1970) (on file
with Yale Law Journal). The opinion was based entirely upon the equal protection
reasoning of Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77
(1969), where the California supreme court struck down a broad exclusion of aliens
from public employment because of the imprecision of the exclusion. As in Miranda,
the Attorney General's analysis was not peculiar to the teaching profession; hence the
opinion provides little guidance for resolving the present problem. The attorneys general
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have also concluded that statutes excluding alien teachers
are void. The Attorney General of Pennsylvania, writing prior to Sugarman and Griffiths,
reached the significant conclusion that teaching, like medicine, "is not a central govern-
mental function . . ." and hence could not support a citizenship requirement. 3 PA. BULL.
204 (Jan. 27, 1973). The opinion of the Attorney General of New Jersey relied on Sugar-
man and Griffiths to find the statute unconstitutionally imprecise. N.J. Att'y Gen. Formal
Op. No. 10, Sept. 23, 1974.
For a related challenge to restrictions on granting tenure to alien teachers on a college
faculty, see Younus v. Shabat, 336 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
46. In The Republic, Socrates praises the role of education in determining the char-
acter of a political community:
Indeed . . . when a state once has a proper start, it grows as a circle would
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cation is to provide the citizen with intellectual skills sufficient for
effective participation in the political system. A second function is
to transmit common values, attitudes, and political knowledge.47
A. Literacy and Political Participation
For a citizen to participate effectively in a political system that re-
lies on the evaluation of ideas and on informed choice, it is impor-
tant that he possess at least minimal skills of reading and writing.48
But the restriction of teacher certification to those qualified to teach
reading and writing can more effectively be accomplished by testing
all applicants, including aliens, for verbal and written fluency. Ex-
clusion of aliens from teaching positions in the public schools thus
is not substantially related to the educational task of ensuring that
citizens are literate.
B. Political Socialization
A more fundamental way in which education affects the political
community is in the process of political socialization-the transmission
of political knowledge, attitudes, and values from one generation to
grow. Training and education being kept good engender good natures; and good
natures holding fast to the good education become even better than those before
*.... Then to put it shortly, this one thing needful-training and education-is
what the overseers of the city must cleave to, and they must take care that it is not
corrupted insensibly. They must guard it beyond everything ....
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV, 424B (OV. Rouse transl. 1956). The United States has
recognized since its inception the importance of public education to the political com-
munity. See, e.g., the Ordinance of 1787, art. III, 1 Stat. 51-52 n.(a): "Religion, morality,
and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." One reason frequently
suggested for providing public education is its role in nurturing "good" citizenship. See
D. JAROS, SOCIALIZATION To POLITICS 9-12 (1973); A. MoRIs, supra note 6, at XIV (1974);
Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America, 40
HARV. EDuc. REV. 567, 569 (1970).
47. These purposes of education often are not differentiated explicitly by the courts.
E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educdtion to our 'democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.
48. The importance of general intellectual skills to political participation has been
a primary justification for the promotion of compulsory public education. See, e.g.,
MINN. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1:
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the in-
telligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a gen-
eral and uniform system of public schools.
See In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 686, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165, 168 (1961) (dictum). Educa-
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 90, 1975
another.49 This shaping of political culture can be critical to the
character and stability of the political community, for each new gen-
eration "emerges upon the political scene as a tabula rasa . . . upon
which a political system must seek to imprint its image . . . if it is
to persist in some form." 5°0
With the family and the peer group, the school is recognized as a
crucial agent of political socialization.51 A teacher's role in the process
of political and cultural learning becomes critical because a teacher
is quite often the first nonfamilial spokesman of society that a child
regularly encounters, and functions in the classroom as a model for
tion seems to be positively correlated with various indices of political participation, such as
following politics and election campaigns, engaging in political discussions, belonging to
voluntary organizations, and believing oneself capable of influencing the government.
G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 317-18 (1965). Of course, such correlation
does not establish that literacy is the cause of or prerequisite to political participation.
49. Fred I. Greenstein, a leading sociologist, has defined political socialization as
follows:
Narrowly conceived, political socialization is the deliberate inculcation of political
information, values and practices by instructional agents who have been formally
charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all po-
litical learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of
the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally
nonpolitical learning that affects political behavior, such as the learning of politically
relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality
characteristics.
Greenstein, Political Socialization, 14 INT'L ENCYCLO. OF THE SOCIAL Set. 551 (1968). See
Easton 8: Hess, The Child's Political World, 6 MIDWEST J. OF POLL. Scl. 229, 230 (1962).
50. Easton g: Hess, supra note 49, at 232. See Greenstein, supra note 49, at 551.
51. On the role of the school in the political socialization process, see EDUCATION AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (J. Coleman ed. 1965); R. DAWSON K- K. PREWTT, POLITICAL
SOCIALIZATION (1969); D. EASTON & J. DENNIS, CHILDREN IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: ORI-
GINS OF POLITICAL LEGrrIIMACY (1969); R. HEss & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PO-
LITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN (Anchor Books 1968); M. JENNINGS & R. NIEMI, THE
POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ADOLESCENCE (1974); R. MERELMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND
EDUCATIONAL CLIMATES (1971); C. 'MERRIAM, THE MAKING OF CITIZENS (1931); ef. Tapp
& Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1974).
Indeed because the school is the only major agent of the process subject to formal
control and direction by the community, some commentators view it as the most im-
portant means of introducing a child to the political system. See R. HESS & J. TORNEY,
supra at 120; Greenstein, supra note 49, at 553-54. The school deals with children
throughout impressionable and formative periods of development and is instrumental in
conveying early concrete perceptions of the political institutions, values, and attitudes
upon which the community is based. R. DAWSON 8 K. PREWITT, supra at 178. Justice
Douglas was quite likely correct in describing the school as the "cradle of our democracy."
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Dawson and Prewitt have identified several ways in which the public school acts as
an agent of political socialization. "Classroom ritual life"-saluting the flag, patriotic
songs, discussion of national heroes and events, and systematic exposure to other symbols
and ceremonies-may produce an attachment to the nation and its political values and
institutions. R. DAWSON & K. PREwrTT, supra at 155-58. A second major instrument of
political socialization is the school curriculum. In deciding on the subjects which are to be
taught and the materials to be used, the school system consciously attempts to provide
the student with formal political knowledge. Id. at 147-55.
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acceptable behavior and social attitudes.52 This special task of the
teacher could place his or her employment within the excepted area
recognized by Sugarman for functions essential to a representative
political community.53 The premise of the discrimination against
aliens would be that an alien, who often has not been fully exposed
to American political culture, cannot serve as effectively as the citizen
as an agent of political socialization. 4
To examine the validity of that premise, it may be helpful to use
the models suggested by Robert Hess and Judith Torney5 to describe
the ways in which a teacher influences the political orientation of his
or her students.
52. [Fjor the child the teacher represents an authoritative spokesman of society. The
teacher is often the first model of political authority the beginning student en-
counters. How new this kind of authority is to a child can be seen by comparing
the parent and the teacher. When a child responds to his parent as an authority
figure, he does not separate the role from the incumbent of the role. . . .The
public school teacher as an authority figure, on the other hand, is much more like
a political authority. The child learns that the authority role and incumbent of
the role are separate factors. . . . [H]e discovers that rewards and punishments
from authorities are affected by identifiable constraints that operate on the par-
ticular person in the role. The teacher, like the policeman, president, or mayor, is
part of an institutional pattern, a constitutional order.
R. DAwsoN & K. PREwrr, supra note 51, at 158. In addition,
attitudes toward achievement, toward change, toward fair play, toward manipula-
bility of the environment, toward cooperation, as well as toward obedience and
competitiveness, can be shaped by the culture of the classroom. . . . [S] uch com-
ponents of one's world have important "spill-over" effects and shape political
outlooks.
Id. at 165.
The courts have recognized the extraordinary responsibility that our society places on
the teacher. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960), quoting Adler v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) (" 'A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom.
There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live.
In this, the state has a vital concern.' ") Justice Frankfurter decribed teachers as "the
priests of our democracy" and emphasized their "special task" in society which must
be fulfilled "by precept and practice." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53. The states would have to show that a purpose of the discriminatory statutes was to
ensure effective political socialization. They might point to provisions in their educational
laws concerned with the promotion of good citizenship. For example the state of Wash-
ington might point to the following rather straitlaced provision:
No person, whose certificate or permit authorizing him to teach in the common
schools of this state has been revoked due to his failure to endeavor to impress on
the minds of his pupils the principles of patriotism, or to train them up to the
true comprehension of the rights, duty and dignity of American citizenship, shall
be permitted to teach in any common school in this state.
WASH. R~v. CODE § 28A.67.030 (1970).
54. See, e.g., R. DAwsoN & K. PREWTrr, supra note 51, at 160-61:
One major reason why teachers operate so effectively in this connection [as con-
veyors of consensus values] is that they are products of the same political sociali-
zation for which they serve as agents. Teachers generally do not need to be taught
to laud the virtues of the nation. Their own political selves have been shaped in
accordance with the very consensus values they now transmit.
55. R. HEss & J. ToRNEY, supra note 51, at 22-26.
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1. Identification with the Teacher
The "identification" model emphasizes imitation by the student of
the behavior and attitudes of the teacher.56 In exchanges with the
student, a teacher inevitably conveys many of his or her own cul-
tural attitudes, influencing political orientation well beyond the formal
curriculum and any conscious effort to impart political information. r'
The states' concern would be that regardless of any conscious attempt
by an alien teacher to avoid affecting the political outlook of students,
they will be so influenced. Thus an alien teacher would "distort" the
process of socialization, if one accepts the premise that aliens are likely
to have political and cultural attitudes different from those of citizens
that cannot feasibly or constitutionally be "tested for" as part of
the certification process. A second concern might be that an alien,
who by definition has a formal foreign political allegiance, may
impede the usual socialization of pupils to a domestic political al-
legiance. This concern for undivided allegiance underlies statutes
which allow an alien to teach once he or she has declared an intention
to become a United States citizen."s
2. Acquiring Political Knowledge
An attempt to exclude aliens from public school teaching could
also rely on the "accumulation" model of political socialization. This
model views political socialization as proceeding by an accretion of po-
litical knowledge and information. Unlike the identification model,
accumulation concerns the conscious, direct, and formal transfer of
information.r0
The argument that an alien teacher is less effective than a citizen
in fulfilling this part of political socialization might be two-fold. First,
it could be argued that an alien is not sufficiently conversant with the
American political system to effectively teach formal aspects of political
culture. Second, there is some evidence that civic education is more
successful when the formal content of the curriculum is in harmony
with the political orientation of the teacher, so that his or her more
casual statements about politics and government are consonant with
the formal curriculum.00 Thus, the states could assert that even if the
56. Id. at 24.
57. For example, the manner in which the class is conducted, whcthcr authoritarian
or democratic, may affect the political views of the students. R. DAWSON & K. PREVwITT,
supra note 51, at 165-67.
58. For a listing of such statutes, see note 11 supra.
59. R. HEss & J. TORNEY, supra note 51, at 23; Greenstein, supra note 49, at 551.
60. See R. DAWSON & K. PREWITr, supra note 51, at 149-50; R. HEss & J. TORNEY,
supra note 51, at 127-32; Litt, Civic Education, Community Norms and Political In-
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alien has the requisite knowledge of the subject matter, his or her pre-
sentation of the material will likely be less effective than that of the
citizen.
III. An Alien's Right to Teach
In view of the narrowing of the field of permissible discrimination
against aliens in Sugarman and Griffiths, the argument in support of
denying teacher certification to aliens must rest principally on the
state's assertion of a compelling interest in using its public schools
for political socialization. The courts may view the statutory require-
ments for naturalization-including five years' residence and demon-
strated familiarity with American history and government-as support
for the proposition that an alien is not sufficiently conversant with
American mores and political institutions to act as an effective agent
of political socialization in the public schools.01 As Justice Rehnquist
argued in his dissent in Sugarman, the major goal of the naturaliza-
tiorl process is to ensure that aliens demonstrate the familiarity with
American culture which citizens as a class are presumed to gain from
"formal education and basic social contact."62 The courts also may
look to the rationale used in Perkins and in Gordon-Nikkar, where
aliens were excluded from jury service because they were assumed to
be less familiar with national and local institutions.
Yet the state's interest must be deemed sufficient to justify a suspect
classification. One consideration that might demote a legitimate state
interest from status as a compelling one is the First Amendment prob-
lem raised in the state's attempt to control the process of socialization.
In addition, the means used by the state to advance the interest may
not be sufficiently precise.
Because the teacher's role in the process of socialization encompasses
doctrination, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 69, 73, 74 (1963). Litt studied civic education in three
Boston high schools, in upper middle class, lower middle class, and working class neigh-
borhoods. He concluded that the influence of the formal civics curriculum was greatest
when it was congruent with the attitudes towards government and political participation
generally held in the community.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1,423 (1970) provides that an alien seeking naturalization must show "an
understanding of the English language" and "a knowledge and understanding of the
fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government, of the
United States." The House Judiciary commented on this provision:
Through the system of citizenship classes sponsored by the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service and the local school system, the alien is aided in preparing himself for
citizenship, and every effort is made to give him fundamental and uniform knowl-
edge of our political and social structure.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1952).
62. Sugarnan v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 659 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
the majority in both Sugarman and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)).
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the distinct phenomena of identification and direct political teaching,
the character of the state's interest should be assessed in light of each.
A. First Amendment Considerations
In educating the young in citizenship, there should be unusually
scrupulous attention to the First Amendment,' 3 "if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount im-
portant principles of our government as mere platitudes."04 In eval-
uating the requirements of the First Amendment in the present con-
text,65 a distinction may be made between attempts by the state to
exclude from its public schools political influences deemed to be un-
favorable and efforts to include socializing influences that transfer po-
litical information thought to be important.
1. Identification with the Teacher
A fundamental value which lies at the core of the political system
is freedom of speech and thought. It would be ironic indeed for states
concerned with the education of a critical citizenry to exclude in-
fluences from the public schools that might cast doubt on the un-
thinking acceptance of generally held political values and attitudes.
Yet, at the heart of the argument based on the identification model
is the fear that the unconscious transfer of foreign political and cul-
tural values will "distort" the political socialization process. Denying
teacher certification to aliens on this ground necessarily amounts to
an effort to exclude "unfavorable" influences from the process of po-
litical socialization.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in recognizing parents' right to have
their children educated in private schools, the Court rejected the
state's use of the public schools to "standardize" the next generation
of citizens. 66 Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,67 the Court invalidated
63. The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, including freedom of speech, are
protected against state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Thus they are applicable to state rcgulation of
the public schools.
64. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
65. The arguments made below in regard to the limits placed by the First Amend-
ment on a state s interest in politicaf socialization in the public schools apply a fortiori
to any attempt to require citizenship for teaching in nonpublic schools.
66. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (emphasis added):
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere cleature
of the State ....
67. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer preceded the express incorporation of First Amendment
rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.
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a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in the
public schools, spurning Nebraska's contention that allowing foreign-
born students to be taught their native language would "inculcate
in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this
country."'0 8 Interpreting Meyer in a later decision, the Court has as-
serted that a state may not conduct its schools to deliberately "foster
a homogeneous people." 60 The Court's strong support for academic
freedom 70 and careful restriction of loyalty oaths for teachers 7' also
reflect the view that the First Amendment will not tolerate laws that
"cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ' 72 Rather, students should
be exposed to "that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of au-
thoritative selection.' ",73
The exclusion of alien teachers out of a fear of the unconscious
transfer of foreign attitudes and values is an effort to standardize and
68. Id. at 398. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (invalidating re-
strictions on foreign language schools in the Territory of Hawaii).
69. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969). In Tinker, the Court restrained the defendant school district, on First Amend-
ment grounds, from disciplining two high school students for wearing black arm bands
protesting the Viet Nam War in violation of a school regulation. In citing Meyer,
the Court noted that the decision "expressed this Nation's repudiation of the principle
that a state might so conduct its schools as to 'foster a homogeneous people.'" Id.
70. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), invalidating New
York State's Feinberg Law. The law required the state board of regents to issue regu-
lations for the disqualification or removal of faculty in the state educational system
who were "disloyal" and to make a list of "subversive" organizations, membership in
which would constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment. The
Supreme Court found the statute and implementing regulations invalid on First Amend-
ment grounds and stressed the value of academic freedom: "Our Nation is deeply com-
mitted to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendant value to all of
us ...." Id. at 603.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), the Court reversed a contempt
citation against a university professor who refused to testify about the content of his
lectures in an investigation conducted by the state attorney general. While the Court
based its holding on the vagueness of the New Hampshire statute authorizing the at-
torney general to conduct such an inquiry, the Couit also emphasized the importance
of academic freedom:
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.
Id. at 250. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedon, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045
(1968).
71. The Supreme Court has consistently held the statutes requiring such oaths to be
o~ rbroad and vague. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullit,
377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); cf. Key-
ishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE L.J. 841; Note, Academic Freedom in the
Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1176 (1973).
72. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
73. Id. at 603, quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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homogenize the process of political socialization. As such, it is incon-
sistent with First Amendment values. Though there are some diffi-
culties with arguing that the citizenship requirements themselves
violate the First Amendment,7' the inconsistency may well render
illegitimate any state interest based on the identification model of
political socialization. At the very least, such a justification is suffi-
ciently opposed to the spirit of the First Amendment to be properly
disqualified from status as a compelling interest.7 5
2. Acquiring Political Information
The accumulation model of socialization is concerned not with the
unconscious transfer of values and attitudes, but rather with the di-
rect and formal imparting of political information. The states would
assert that the alien teacher performs this function less effectively
than the citizen for two reasons. First, aliens, as a class, are presumed
to be less conversant with the political information to be transferred.
Second, because the presentation of this material is more effective
when the content is in harmony with the political orientation of the
teacher, aliens may be less successful in their presentation even if
they have the requisite knowledge. This aspect of political socializa-
tion focuses not so much on the exclusion of unfavorable influences
as on the affirmative task of conveying political information.
74. The difficulties are several. For one, there is no explicit speech or line of thought
being repressed. Secondly, and more significantly, a decision invalidating these laws as
violative of the First Amendment would call into question all efforts at political so-
cialization. For in a real sense, all political socialization involves an imposition of values.
75. The Supreme Court used analogous reasoning in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968). In Williams, the Court invalidated several Ohio election laws that made it
virtually impossible for any political party other than the Republicans or Democrats to
be placed on the state ballot used to choose electors pledged to candidates for the
presidency and vice presidency. Id. at 24. Two political parties challenged the statutes on
the ground that they denied equal protection to the parties' supporters. The Court
found that the questioned statutes "place[d] burdens" on the First Amendment right of
freedom of association. Id. at 30. As a result, the Court demanded that Ohio demonstrate
a "compelling interest" in order to justify the laws.
In an effort to meet this test, the state asserted that it had a compelling interest
in the promotion of a two-party system. However, the Court refused to classify this
interest as compelling for purposes of the equal protection analysis because the interest
itself was inconsistent with First Amendment values. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
stated:
[Ohio] claims that the State may validly promote a two-party system in order
to encourage compromise and political stability. The fact is, however, that the Ohio
system does not merely favor a "two-party system"; it favors two particular parties
. . . and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of course,
no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the right to
have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and governmental
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The legitimacy of the state's concern with the harmonious relation-
ship between the content of the curriculum and the personal political
orientation of the teacher is open to question, because of general
judicial disfavor for state inquiry into personal political beliefs. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of the state's
interest in using its schools for the shaping and preservation of the
political community by transfer of important political information.7
Therefore, the state's interest in ensuring that its teachers possess the
requisite knowledge of the political system and political institutions
would appear to be compelling.
B. Imprecision
The Supreme Court in Sugarman noted that a statute restricting
alien employment must be drawn with great precision, excluding
aliens only where necessary to the protection of the state's compelling
76. Take, for instance, the flag salute cases. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld a state regulation requiring that pupils in
public school participate in a daily flag salute ceremony. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the Court, emphasized the state's interest in using its schools for the promotion and
preservation of the political community.
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.
Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which
may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation
to generation, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which
constitutes a civilization.
. .. The influences which help toward a common feeling for the common country
are manifold. Some may seem harsh and others no doubt are foolish. Surely, how-
ever, the end is legitimate.
Id. at 596, 598. It was for this reason that the Court would not "exercise censorship over
the conviction of legislatures that a particular program or exercise will best promote in
the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions
of their country." Id. at 599.
In West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court overruled
Gobitis on the question of compelling students to salute the flag. However, the Court
seemed to question only the means by which the state sought to use its schools for
political socialization and not the legitimacy of the end itself. Justice Jackson, writing
for the Court, asserted:
As the present CHIEF JUsTICE [Stone] said in dissent in the Gobitis case, the State
may "require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the
structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty,
which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country." 310 U.S. at 604. Here, how-
ever, we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. They are not
merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to
what it is or even what it means. The issue here is whether this slow and easily
neglected route to aroused loyalties constitutionally may be short cut by substi-
tuting a compulsory salute and slogan.
Id. at 631 (footnotes omitted). The courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere
extensively with the curriculum of the public schools, emphasizing that they are ill-
equipped to substitute for school boards or legislatures in the determination of what is
essential to a successful program of compulsory public education. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v.
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interest. 77 Therefore, even if one concedes that the state's interest in
the accumulation aspect of political socialization is compelling and
that it places public school teaching within the Sugarman exception,
the analysis still is not complete. Discriminatory state statutes, as pres-
ently enacted, generally exclude aliens from all teaching positions in
the public schools, without regard to grade level or subject matter.
There are several more precise and "less drastic means"78 for advanc-
ing the state's interest.
The statutes in their present form exclude alien teachers at all grade
levels. While the process of political socialization continues throughout
life, the most critical period seems to be between the ages of three
and 13.79 The state's interest in political socialization, though argu-
ably compelling in elementary school education, thus wanes consider-
ably in the high school. The varying interest of the state in primary
and secondary education was recognized in Wisconsin v. Y'oder,80 where
the Court held that a state could not compel the attendance of Amish
children in the public schools beyond the eighth grade. One com-
mentator concludes that this decision struck a severe blow to any
state interest in secondary education. 8' As such, the precision demanded
by use of a suspect classification would limit the permissible exclusion
of alien teachers to the elementary school level.
If the state's compelling interest in political socialization is limited
to the formal transfer of political information, it would also appear
that the exclusion of alien teachers must be limited to subjects in which
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1922.) Though the reluctance of the courts to intervene in
public school operations has been waning (see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)), one
still might expect considerable deference as to the content of curriculum.
77. See p. 95 & note 23 supra.
78. See note 15 supra.
79. See, e.g., R. HEss 9. J. TORNEY, supra note 51, at 131; M. JENNINGS & R. NIEII,
supra note 51, at 181-206; Easton & Hess, supra note 49, at 236; Greenstein, supra note
49, at 554. These works suggest that much of one's basic political socialization occurs
before the end of the elementary school years. This, of course, is not to suggest that
political attitudes and orientation do not change after the eighth grade, but only that
the state's interest is stronger in primary education.
80. 406 U.S. 205, 227 (1972) ("[T]here is at best a speculative gain, in terms of meet-
ing the duties of citizenship, from an additional one or two years of compulsory formal
education [beyond the eighth grade].")
81. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amcndment's
Religious Clauses, 75 IV. VA. L. REv. 213, 229-30 (1973). It should be noted that even on
the elementary school level, the state's interest in public education may be outweighed
by other concerns. Thus, in 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, the Court
held that the state's interest in public education must yield to the parents' right to
provide for equivalent education in priate schools. The Court affirmed an injunction
restraining the state of Oregon from requiring compulsory attendance at public schools.
Similarly, in concluding that teaching is not a "central governmental function" and hence
unable to support a citizenship requirement, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania noted
that teaching is often "entrusted to private institutions." 3 PA. BULL. 204 (Jan. 27, 1973).
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this information is most central, such as civics and historys - There-
fore, the statutes in their present form are overbroad in a second way,
for they exclude alien teachers regardless of the subject matter they
are to teach. Since, at the elementary school level, one teacher most
often teaches all subjects, if the state wishes to exclude aliens it should
be required to create specialist positions for teachers of history and
civics. Indeed, the state can probably protect its interest in the teach-
ing of these subjects by testing the competence of individual teachers
at the certification stage,83 thus invalidating any automatic exclusion
of aliens from public school teaching.
82. Even in these subjects there is some controversy as to the impact of the teacher
on the political orientation of his students. See Jennings, Ehman & Niemi, Social Studies
Teachers and Their Pupils, in M. JENNINGS & R. Nm.sx, supra note 51, at 207.
83. All states require teachers to attend an accredited teacher education institution to
be eligible for certification. See T. STINNErr, supra note 7, at 35. This alone may
make unnecessary the exclusion of alien teachers from the public schools, for it ensures
an opportunity for the state to monitor competency.
